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This paper presents results from an econometric analysis of Russian bank defaults during 
the period 1997–2003, focusing on the extent to which publicly available information from 
quarterly bank balance sheets is useful in predicting future defaults. Binary choice models 
are estimated to construct the probability of default model. We find that preliminary expert 
clustering or automatic clustering improves the predictive power of the models and incor-
poration of macrovariables into the models is useful. Heuristic criteria are suggested to 
help compare model performance from the perspectives of investors or banks supervision 
authorities. Russian banking system trends after the crisis 1998 are analyzed with rolling 
regressions. 
 
Keywords: banks, Russia, probability of default model, early warning systems 
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Tutkimus käsittelee ekonometrisin menetelmin venäläisten pankkien konkursseja vuosina 
1997-2003. Haluamme selvittää, onko pankkien neljännesvuosittain julkaisemista tasetie-
doista apua konkurssien ennustamisessa. Käytämme logit-menetelmää konkurssimallin ra-
kentamiseen. Havaintoaineiston ryhmittely joko asiantuntijoiden arvioiden tai automaatti-
sen algoritmin avulla parantaa mallin ennustuskykyä. Myös makrotaloudellisten muuttuji-
en lisääminen malliin auttaa ennustamaan konkursseja. Arvioimme mallien ennustuskykyä 
sijoittajille ja pankkivalvojille tärkeiden kriteerien avulla. Venäjän pankkijärjestelmän ke-
hitystä vuoden 1998 kriisin jälkeen analysoidaan liukuvan regression avulla. 
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1  Introduction and brief literature survey 
 
This paper investigates the usefulness of econometric probability of default models based 
on publicly available information drawn from banks’ balance sheets in predicting the fu-
ture solvency of Russian banks. 
Many experts on financial structures, however, including those at the Economic 
Education and Research Consortium (EERC),
1 hold out little hope for constructing such 
models for the Russian case. They note that factors besides the financial condition of banks 
and the macroeconomic environment are also important in determining long-term sol-
vency. These include many less-formalized factors such as politics, bank affiliations with 
industrial or financial groups, bank activities profile, practices and quality of management. 
Moreover, Russian bank balance sheet data, which are still based on Russian ac-
counting practices, are of questionable quality and lack the transparency of books prepared 
in accordance with internationally accepted standards. 
The importance of the quality of the accounting data for statistical models of bank 
risk is demonstrated on US banks data in Gunther and Moore (2003). In their study of fail-
ures of high-yield bond prediction, Marchesini et al. (2004) observe “balance sheets … can 
be and have been severely manipulated.” 
The rapid development of Russia’s banking system (since Russia began the transi-
tion to a market economy) has brought with it a rich body of numerical material for 
econometric analysis. Russia still has many commercial banks, although the number has 
dropped from about 2500 in 1995–1996 to around 1300 at present. This situation offers a 
wealth of material for econometric study. In contrast, the 1989 sample of 1030 of largest 
US banks used by Kolari et al. (2002) only included 18 defaults. The sample of 5598 ob-
servations of US banks between 1970 and 1976 used by Martin (1977) includes just 23 
failures. 
Our sample of Russian banks is not especially skewed. Skewed samples in a logis-
tic regression (two substantially unequal-sized response groups) are known to produce bi-
ased test statistics and potentially faulty conclusions (e.g. Aldrich and Nelson, 1985; Stone 
and Rasp, 1991). 
The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel 2004) proposes that banks could use the In-
ternal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) in evaluating potential bank partners and bank su-
                                                 
1 EERC, July 2003, M. Shaffer et al. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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pervision authorities could use Early Warning Systems (EWS) in monitoring of the bank-
ing system. These measures are expected to enhance the stability of banking and financial 
systems. Statistical models of bank credibility based on publicly available information 
could logically be included as part of an IRB or EWS. 
Investors, banks and firms need to be able to evaluate the credibility of potential 
banking partners, while expediency dictates that banking supervision authorities need to be 
able to screen banks off-site to identify troubled banks and concentrate their efforts on on-
site examinations of such banks. 
International credit rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
rate the creditworthiness and quality of many banks. These ratings could be used in the 
IRB or EWS. However, such ratings are fundamentally lacking in Russia’s case. First, the 
top international rating agencies only rate a couple dozen Russian banks. The ratings they 
do provide are consistently low; S&P rated 22 Russian banks in September 2004 with only 
three rating categories: CCC, B or BB (state-owned Vneshtorgbank was the sole BB rat-
ing). Second, these ratings tend to be conservative and rarely get changed (Löffler, 2004, 
and Altman and Rijken, 2004, detail the reasons for rating stability and related loss of in-
formation). Russia itself has only a few credit rating agencies, and they hardly compare 
with the international agencies in the eyes of Russian financial experts or the world (Soest 
et al., 2003). 
Actually, there are only a limited number of approaches to statistical modeling of 
bank credibility based on publicly available information. 
First, one could use existing bank ratings issued by a rating agency and construct a 
statistical model for such ratings. The model would reflect that part of the rating informa-
tion derived from public information. The natural choice of econometric model here is 
likely the ordered response model (ordered logit/probit). Once the model is designed, the 
rating criteria could be extended to an entire set of banks. That model would reflect the 
opinion of the rating agency experts. This approach has been suggested for Russian banks 
in Soest et al. (2003) and for non-financial US firms in Altman and Rijken (2004). 
A second approach is based on surveying experts. The experts are asked to rate a 
number of real banks and “virtual” banks, consisting solely of numerical information of 
parameters from balance sheets. Thereafter, it is possible to fit an ordered probit model that 
reflects the opinion of the set of experts. A possible advantage of this method is that the 
model incorporates the opinion of experts representing various financial structures. Of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2004 
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course, when banks pay the rating agency for their rating, this may potentially lead to a 
situation where the rating agency is reluctant to give a downgrade. On the other hand, rat-
ing agency experts are likely to have extensive information on the rated bank. That ap-
proach was realized in Soest et al. (2003). 
The third is to derive a statistical model of bank risk, stability and credibility (which 
we generally refer to here as “reliability”) based on historical data of bank defaults. The 
natural choice for an econometric model here would be the binary choice model 
(logit/probit). This approach is applied to Russian banks in Golovan et al. (2003, 2004). 
Efforts at designing a model for predicting the probability of bank defaults has a 
long history. To the best of our knowledge, Altman (1968) was the first to apply a statisti-
cal model to predicting bankruptcy of non-financial firms. He uses discriminant analysis to 
construct a model to predict firm bankruptcy. The model uses input values from five finan-
cial ratios for the firms, one or two years before the firm enters (or avoids) bankruptcy. 
Martin (1977) pioneered application of a binary choice model (logit) to prediction of bank 
failure. He employs a two-year horizon between the statement year for the financial ratio 
data and the observation year of the bank’s situation (failed/operating). 
Numerous papers discuss the use of the logit/probit approach in modeling probabil-
ity of default. Wiginton (1980) finds the logit model results superior to discriminant analy-
sis for consumer credit scoring. Ohlson (1980) applies a logit model to data from 1970–
1976 to discern statistically significant factors for predicting the probability that a firm will 
fail in the coming year. Lawrence et al. (1992) use logit analysis of default risk in mobile 
home credits in the US in 1974–1980. Westgaard and Wijst (2001) employ a logit model 
for analysis of default factors affecting Norwegian limited liability companies during 
1995–1999, finding that a two-year period between the firm status and firm accounting 
data is optimal. They use the log of firm’s total assets as a measure of firm size and find 
that removing observations with extreme values from the dataset and truncating the pa-
rameters improves the statistical quality of the model. Kolari et al. (2002) takes a logit ap-
proach to modeling probability of default for US banks in 1989–1990. Lenox (1999) uses a 
sample of 949 UK firms (6416 observations) to study logit, probit and discriminant analy-
sis models performance for the prediction of the firm failure. He finds logit/probit models 
with specification of heteroscedasticity are superior to logit/probit models without hetero-
scedasticity or discriminant analysis. The paper is unclear, however, as whether the im-Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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provement in model performance is due to correct heteroscedasticity specification or sim-
ply to a model with more parameters. 
Some papers use non-statistical methods to set up a model for default prediction. 
For example, Kolari et al. (2002) use a trait recognition model, or TRA (a kind of the im-
age recognition algorithm), while H. and P. Espahbodi (2003) use recursive partitioning. 
Other non-statistical methods include neural networks, Markov models, CAMELS and fi-
nancial ratios. There is no evidence that these methods perform better than the statistical 
approach. On the contrary, Altman et al (1994) conclude that discriminant analysis and 
logit model outperform neural networks in prediction of corporate distress. Jagtiani, Kolary 
et al. (2003) conclude that a “simple linear (logit) model performs better than more com-
plex EWS models such as TRA.” 
The paper is innovative for at least four reasons. First, we focus on constructing 
probability of default models for Russian banks. Second, we discuss the need for prelimi-
nary clustering of banks and the possible need for separate logit models for each cluster. Of 
course, it would be better to have a cluster procedure oriented to the best fit of logit model 
in clusters. For this purpose, we introduce a model that combines a clustering procedure 
with logit model fitting. Third, we examine the extent to which macroeconomic variables 
are helpful in predicting bank defaults. Fourth, we introduce a new approach to model 
comparison, because comparison of model performance is a bit problematic. One can com-
pare statistical significance of the models or rates of correct prediction, but such informa-
tion is not particularly important to an investor. Thus, we apply heuristic criteria that re-
flect the expected extra profit for an investor using the model. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we examine how helpful clustering 
of the banks is for determining model performance. We use expert and automatic cluster-
ing procedures. The probability of a bank to survive during the financial and banking crisis 
of the August 1998 is modeled. In section 3, we construct probability of defaults models 
for Russian banks during 1996–2003. During this period, Russia’s macroeconomic envi-
ronment changed considerably, so it makes sense to use macrovariables to improve model 
performance. The heuristic criteria for model comparison are introduced. In section 4, the 
study of the models estimated on one- and two-years rolling windows are used to analyze 
changes in the Russian banking system after the 1998 financial crisis. Section 5 concludes. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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2  Does clustering help? 
 
Historical bank accounts data are rarely used in constructing probit/logit models for deter-
mining probability of bank default. We find US bank data are used in the papers of Martin 
(1977), Bovenzi et al. (1983), Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998), Estrella (2000), Kolari et al. 
(2002), and Russian bank data are employed in Golovan et al. (2003, 2004). Godlewski 
(2004) takes data for banks in emerging market economies (excluding Russia). To the best 
of our knowledge, the US Federal Reserve is the only supervisory authority to use such a 
model (SEER) as a part of its EWS (Sahajawala, Berg, 2000). 
In this section, we examine factors that predict bank survival after Russia’s finan-
cial and banking crisis of August 1998. Prior to 1998, banks had little involvement in fi-
nancial intermediation in the real sector. Instead, they preferred to speculate in financial 
markets, a problem all too familiar to the government and the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR) at the time. This is why we place special emphasis on the role of the ratio of credits 
to real economy to bank’s total assets in this study. 
Russian banks vary considerably in terms of size, activities, involvement in the 
government bond market (GKOs), volumes of credits extended to the real sector of econ-
omy, volumes of private deposits, etc. Many small banks and more than half of the twelve 
largest banks did not survive the 1998 crisis. This suggests that a single logit model may be 
insufficient for modeling the probability of default for such a diverse set of banks, and 
models for several bank clusters are preferable. 
To the best of our knowledge, only Korobow and Stuhr (1983) use clustering of 
banks for an early warning system. They suggest clustering (peer groups) by bank size or 
by the existence of at least one foreign office. 
But how helpful is clustering of Russian banks for model performance? To find out, 
we first cluster banks using a financial ratio. Thereafter, we design and test an automatic 
procedure. 
The CBR uses de facto clustering in bank regulation. For example, it has separate 
capital adequacy requirements for small and large banks (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
 Equity  over  €5 million   Equity less than €5 million 
01.02.1999 – 01.01.2000  8%  9% 
01.01.2000 – present  10%  11% Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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2.1  Data 
 
Our sample comprises 1569 Russian and their accounting data for April 1, 1998.
2 We ex-
amine our sample to determine which banks were failed as of April 1, 2000. The two-year 
period was chosen for two reasons: it covers the average time between license withdrawal 
and bank liquidation, and the two-year period appears to have the highest predictive power. 
For our purposes, a bank is marked “failed” and the binary variable LIVE set to 0 if 
the bank meets one of three conditions: 
•  The license was withdrawn before April 1, 2000, 
•  The bank is under the administration of ARCO (Agency for Restructuring Credit 
Organizations), or 
•  The bank is merged with another bank and was in poor financial shape at the time 
of the merger (each case is separately analyzed). 
For all other banks, the variable is set equal 1. We have 263 defaults and 1306 operating 
banks in our sample. Notably, we remove the three state-owned banks – Sberbank, Vne-
sheconombank and Vneshtorgbank from the sample. We also removed from the sample 
several banks with incomplete or erroneous accounting information. Otherwise, our sample 
includes all the Russian banks operating as of April 1, 1998. 
  We test about 30 bank parameters for significance in the default models. Table 2 in-
cludes descriptions of those included in at least one of the model in sections 2, 3 or 4. 
Our models do not use bank parameters themselves, but rather select ratios to total assets 
(i.e. RES/TA, LNI/TA, GB/TA, Eq/TA, LA/TA, DPC/TA, CANW/TA, NGS/TA) that 
characterize the proportion of certain bank activities to total assets. The best results for 
measuring bank size seem to be achieved with the log of total assets (LNTA). The same 
ratios are used in the models of Golovan et al. (2003, 2004). Similar financial ratios are 
also found in Martin (1977), Kolari (2002) and Estrella (2000). Altman (2004) and several 
others use the log of assets to characterize firm size. 
 
                                                 
2 Data are kindly provided by the Mobile Information Agency. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 2 
Parameter Description 
TA   TA  Total assets* (valuta balansa) 
RES  RES  Bank reserves for possible losses. 
LNI  LNI  Loans to non-financial institutions 
GB  GB  Government bonds 
Eq  Eq  Equity 
LA  LA  Liquid assets** 
DPC  DPC  Private customers’ deposits and accounts 
CANW  CANW Capital assets and other non-working assets 
NGS  NGS  Non-government securities 
As  As  Assets (excluding loans and debts to own branches) 
PBT  PBT  Profit before tax 
CFB  CFB  Amounts owed to credit institutions (credits from other banks) 
NWA  NL  Non-working assets 
OVL  OVL  Overdue loans (over 5 days) 
* Under Russian accounting, credits and debts to own branches are included. 
** Calculated per methodology of the Russian journal “Banks and Finance” (Banki i 
finansi). 
 
Descriptive statistics of the parameters for the complete set of banks as of April 1, 1998 are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 LNTA  Eq/TA  LNI/TA  GB/TA LA/TA  NGS/TA  CANW/TA  DPC/TA RES/TA 
Mean 10.72  0.28  0.29  0.07  0.14 0.12  0.20  0.06  0.03 
Maximum 17.88  0.99  0.97  0.89 1.00 0.98  1.00  0.48  0.41 
Minimum 3.22  -0.79  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Std.dev. 1.90  0.23  0.19  0.12 0.16 0.16  0.16  0.08  0.04 
 
Preliminary analysis reveals differences between banks that survived or failed during the 
crisis. Table 4 separates the descriptive statistics of banks that failed (LIVE=0) and those 
that are still operating (LIVE=1) as of April 2000. 
 
Table 4 
 Num.  LNTA  Eq/TA  LNI/TA  GB/TA LA/TA  NGS/TA  CANW/TA  DPC/TA RES/TA 
ALL 1569  10.719  0.281 0.290  0.073  0.136  0.117  0.202  0.063  0.034 
LIVE=0  263 10.533  0.174 0.267  0.024  0.073  0.139  0.285  0.049  0.056 
LIVE=1  1306 10.757  0.303 0.295  0.083  0.149  0.113  0.185  0.065  0.029 
 
To visualize Table 4, each parameter is normalized to its average value with respect to all 
banks. These relative mean values of the parameters are presented in Figure 1. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
 
































































Figure. 1. Relative mean values for failed/surviving bank parameters 
 
The largest differences between mean values of the two pools of banks are found for the 
parameters Eq/TA, GB/TA, and LA/TA, which are significantly higher for the surviving 
banks, and CANW/TA and RES/TA, which are significantly higher for the failed banks. 
Most of these findings are unsurprising. The Eq/TA ratio is similar to the CBR’s 
capital adequacy parameter H1. High share of liquid assets LA/TA and a low share of non-
working assets CANW/TA characterize a bank’s ability to mobilize resources quickly. A 
high share of reserves RES/TA may suggest the bank pursues an aggressive lending policy. 
During the crisis, the Russian government defaulted on GKOs. Unexpectedly, the 
share of government bonds GB/TA is considerably higher for the surviving banks. We of-
fer two explanations for this. First, in a stable developed economy, it is prudent for banks 
to hold government bonds. Thus, non-zero investment into government bonds in 1998 may 
suggest good bank financial management skills. Second, after the crisis, the government 
provided support to certain banks highly invested in the GKO market, thus assuring their 
survival. 
Note that the diagram does not account for differences in bank size (LNTA mean 
values for failed and surviving banks). 
The correlations for bank financial ratios are presented in Appendix A. The size of 
a bank is negatively correlated with the parameters RES/TA, Eq/TA, LA/TA. Large bank 
have better partners and no need to create big reserves for loans. Such a bank (potentially, 
at least) is more stable and could allow lower values of the capital adequacy and liquid as-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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sets. Having many partners, the large bank has good access to the interbank credit market 
and other resources. 
The total banking system equity in the first quarter of 1998 was small compared to 
GDP and there were too many small banks. At the time, bank strategies mostly involved 
strong affiliations with industry or speculation in the highly profitable GKO market. 
 
 
2.2  Models and clusters 
 
We use the binary choice model (1) for modeling probability of bank default 
   ) ' ( ) 1 ( β i i x F LIVE P = = ,                 (1) 
where  x is the vector of the bank i parameters. We found that the logit specification 
1 ) 1 ( ) (
− − + =
z e z F  is marginally better than the probit specification. The equation (1) could 
be estimated using the complete set of banks. If we suppose, however, that for different 
clusters of the banks impact of some of parameters may have different signs, we can con-
clude such parameters insignificant. This argues for a clusterization algorithm. 
Standard cluster analysis procedures, such as the most commonly used k-means 
clustering procedure, that might give interesting results (Bobyshev, 2001) are not suited for 
our purposes as they tend to put points with similar parameter values into one cluster. This 
minimizes the sum of distances between points and cluster centers. However, we want 
clusters that best fit the logit model. 
Wescott (1984) uses the k-means clustering procedure for prediction of US munici-
pal bond ratings in 1977. He concludes that modeling the ratings in each cluster do not im-
prove the model’s ability to explain the rating (and thus bolstering our argument above). 
An alternative approach is to classify banks by their profile of the activity (e.g. 
pocket banks, banks affiliated with some industrial group, banks oriented to serving ex-
port-import operations). Unfortunately, we lack this information for most banks in the sam-
ple. 
Below we use “expert approach” that asks bank experts to classify banks into three 
clusters by giving values to a bank parameter. The expert defines two thresholds, so we 
have three clusters with “small”, “medium” and “large” values of the chosen parameter 
(say, bank size). The logit model is fitted separately for each of cluster. The advantage here 
is ease of cluster interpretation. The disadvantage lies in the subjective choice of thresholds. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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The automatic cluster procedure we use searches for the optimal choice of clusters, 
taking into account the quality of model fit in each cluster. Algorithms that combine 
model-fitting with clustering are well demonstrated (for a very different problem) in Boro-
dovsky and Peresetsky (1994) and Mathe et al. (1999). 
 
 
2.3  Expert approach 
 
Four bank parameters are used for our expert classification. The two thresholds are chosen 
for each of the parameters, respectively, and the banks are classified into three clusters 
with small, medium and large parameter values. 
•  Total assets, TA. Cluster of small banks, TA=1% contains the smallest banks with to-
tal assets equal to 1% of banking system assets. The large bank cluster, TA=90%, contains 
all banks with total assets equal to 90% of banking system assets. 
•  Government bonds ratio (GB/TA). The cluster of banks not participating in the GKO 
market, GB/TA<0.01%, and the cluster of banks heavily invested in GKOs, GB/TA>10%. 
•  Credits-to-non-financial-firms ratio (LNI/TA). The cluster of “passive” banks, 
LNI/TA<15%, and the cluster of the “active” banks, LNI/TA>40%. 
•  Equity ratio, Eq/TA. The cluster of banks with low equity ratios, Eq/TA<11%, and 
the cluster of the banks with high equity ratios, Eq/TA>30%. 
The distribution of the banks over the clusters and the intersections of the clusters is 
presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
















TA=1%  624  0 403  100  197  179  94  359 
TA=90%  0  261 22  93  50  54 78 34 
GB/TA<0.01% 403  22  624  0 187  203  126  301 
GB/TA >10%  100  93  0  378 110  51 40 149 
LNI/TA <15%  197  50  187  110  392  0 89  187 
LNI/TA >40%  179  54  203  51  0  425 50 194 
Eq/TA<11% 94 78 126  40  89  50 268  0 
Eq/TA>30% 359 34  301  149  187 194  0  615 
 
The means of bank ratios over the clusters are presented in Appendix C. The proportion of 
defaults is higher for low values of equity, government bonds, and credits-to-non-financial BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2004 
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institutions ratios. The proportion of defaults is lower for mid-sized banks than small or 
large banks. 
For more detailed study, we divided the entire range of variation of the log of total as-
sets LNTA into intervals and plotted the proportion of failed and surviving banks at each 
interval (Figure 2). The plot shows the number of failed banks at each interval. The U-
shaped plot indicates that medium-size banks were more likely to weather the crisis. 
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  Figure 2. Distribution of bank defaults over LNTA 
 
A similar, but rather monotonous, plot for the default distribution over reserves ratio is pre-
sented in Figure 3. 
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  Figure 3. Distribution of bank defaults over RES/TA 
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The U-shaped distribution of defaults over the private deposits ratio DPC/TA is similar to 
Figure 2. Likewise, the default distribution over ratios for capital assets and other non-
liquid assets and non-government securities has a distribution similar to Figure 3. These 
plots support the preliminary hypothesis that high values of reserves, non-government se-
curities and non-liquid assets ratios increase the probability of default in a crisis. Banks 
with average values for their private customer-deposits-and-accounts ratio have higher 
probabilities of survival. This may appear strange at first glance, but remember that during 
the 1998 crisis many banks simply froze the accounts of their private customers and used 
the money to fulfill other obligations. This is at least part of the reason increases in this ra-
tio increase probability of bank survival. 
For each of the clusters the logit model is selected. Model selection is based on the 
values of LR and McFadden R2 statistics and the z-statistics of the coefficients. A few re-
sults are presented below.
3 
 
Small and large bank clusters, TA=1% and TA=90%.  The small bank cluster, TA=1%, 
has a high mean equity ratio (34%, compared to 28% for all banks and 18% for large 
banks) and a 17% liquid assets ratio (14% for all). All other ratio means do not differ sig-
nificantly from those of all banks. In the small bank cluster, 21% of banks failed (com-
pared to 17% of all banks and 18% of large banks). 
The best models for the two clusters are presented in Table 6. Value  x x s β  measures 
the economic significance of the variable, characterizing the degree of influence of the 
variable on the probability ( x β is the estimated coefficient, and  x s  is the standard deviation 
of the variable in the cluster). 
The coefficients have the expected signs. High equity and liquid assets ratios 
(Eq/TA, LA/TA) increase the probability of survival, while high ratios of reserves, non-
liquid assets and non-government securities increase the probability of default. Bank size 
(LNTA) has a different effect depending on the cluster. Large total assets increase the 
probability of survival for a small bank, but not a large bank. In fact, the four largest com-
mercial banks (SBS-Agro, Incombank, Menatep and Rossiisky Credit) all failed during the 
crisis. Eleven of Russia’s 28 largest banks failed. 
 
                                                 
3 Models for other clusters are found in Golovan (2003), and are also available by email request. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 6† 
Cluster TA=1%    Cluster TA=90% 
Variable Coefficient  x x s β    Variable  Coefficient  x x s β  
C -2.05*      C  7.24 ***  
Eq/TA 1.65***  0.43    Eq/TA  5.71 ***  0.81 
LNTA 0.26**  0.27    LNTA  -0.39 *** -0.46 
NGS/TA -1.67**  -0.31    NGS/TA  -5.94 *** -0.59 
CANW/TA -1.82**  -0.32    CANW/TA  -2.66 ** -0.41 
LNI/TA 4.50***  0.95         
(LNI/TA)
2 -5.64***  -0.87         
GB/TA 8.41***  1.02         
LA/TA 3.35***  0.65         
RES/TA -5.09**  -0.27         
DPC/TA 3.93**  0.29         
McFadden R-squared  0.22   McFadden  R-squared  0.17 
Obs with Dep=0  132    Obs with Dep=0  47 
Obs with Dep=1  492    Obs with Dep=1  214 
Total observations  624   Total  observations  261 
 
The model for the small banks cluster includes a larger number of significant parameters 
that can be readily interpreted. The signs of the coefficients at LNI/TA and (LNI/TA)
2 
suggest the optimal value of the credits-to-non-financial-institutions ratio is about 40%, 
which is close to the current level of real-economy investments of the banking sector. The 
average value for this cluster is 28%, which may suggest non-optimal behavior by the 
banks. 
The private deposits ratio increases the probability of survival. Only 50 failed banks 
and more than 320 surviving banks had non-zero volumes of private deposits. 
The most influential ratios for the small banks are GB/TA and LNI/TA. This is par-
tially explained by the significant amount of pocket banks in that cluster. For large banks 
the equity ratio (i.e. the parameter similar to the H1 capital adequacy coefficient used by 
the CBR) is most important. 
 
Clusters of banks with low and high investments in government bonds, 
GB/TA<0.01% and GB/TA>10%.  Mean size (LNTA) of a bank from the cluster with 
low investments in government bonds is 9.62, while the average size of the bank from the 
second cluster is 11.36 (see Appendix C), which is significantly different from the overall 
average of 10.72. The mean values of other ratios are close to the overall averages. 
                                                 
† In all tables *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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The proportions of failed banks are significantly different in the two clusters: 26% and 
4%, respectively, and differ from the overall proportion of 17%. 
As mentioned earlier, this may suggest that participation at the GKO market is a sign 
of sophistication in bank financial management or that the bank, with its high exposure in 
the GKO market, was a recipient of state support after the crisis. 
The models for the two clusters are presented in Table 7. Credits to the real economy 
are significant for banks that have low investments in government bonds. As before, we 
find the optimal value of the LNI/TA ratio is 58%, which much higher that the cluster av-
erage of 30%. This could mean that banks should have invested more in the real economy. 
The liquid assets and credit-to-non-financial-institutions ratios are most important for the 
banks from that cluster. 
We do not find LNI/TA ratio to be significant for banks in the second cluster. The 
non-liquid assets and non-government securities ratios are significant, however, and hurt 
the credibility of banks that are heavily invested in government bonds. The most important 
factor here is the equity ratio Eq/TA. Bank size has a negative impact, which is explained 
by the fact that most large banks belong to this cluster. 
 
  Table 7 
Cluster GB/TA<0.01%    Cluster GB/TA>10% 
Variable Coefficient  x x s β    Variable  Coefficient  x x s β  
C  -2.81  ***     C  8.69 ***   
Eq/TA  1.38  ***  0.38   Eq/TA  6.45 ***  1.18 
RES/TA  -3.37  *  -0.19   RES/TA  -15.48 **  -0.45 
LNTA  0.24  ***  0.37   LNTA  -0.39 **  -0.70 
LA/TA  4.69  ***  0.95   CANW/TA  -7.93 ***  -0.72 
LNI/TA  4.28  ***  0.92   NGS/TA  -5.74 **  
(LNI/TA)
2  -3.70  *  -0.59         
McFadden R-squared  0.135   McFadden  R-squared  0.22 
Obs with Dep=0  161    Obs with Dep=0  16 
Obs with Dep=1  463    Obs with Dep=1  362 
Total observations  624   Total  observations  378 
 
Models for other clusters are found in Golovan et al. (2003). The Table in Appendix C 
shows the estimation results of a model specification that includes all ratios found signifi-
cant in at least one cluster. The ratios Eq/TA, LA/TA and GB/TA are significant in most 
models. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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The overdue-loans-to-total-assets ratio, which was found to be important for bank failure 
prediction in Bovenzi et al. (1983), is not significant in any of our models. A possible ex-
planation may be that Russian banks masked the actual number of overdue loans at the 
time of observation. Standards of Russian accounting allow banks to reregister and prolong 
credits easily, thus decreasing the reported value of the indicator OVL/TA. 
McFadden R
2 shows that the model fit is better for some clusters than for the entire sam-
ple. Is this improvement in the statistical measure of the model fit important for the predic-
tive power of the model? 
 
In-sample forecast 
Given the estimated model, one can calculate the estimates of probability of survival  i p ˆ  
for the each bank i in the sample. To make a forecast, it is necessary to choose a threshold 
for the decision. The bank is expected to fail if  c pi < ˆ , and survive if  c pi ≥ ˆ . A Type I er-
ror occurs when we predict a bank will survive, and, in fact, it fails. Conversely, a Type II 
error occurs when a bank that was expected to fail survives. The Type I error is obviously 
more costly. The choice of threshold would depend on balancing the cost (aversion) to the 
investor of Type I and Type II errors (see discussion of the Type I-II errors trade-off in 
Bovenzi et al., 1983). For each choice of the threshold, given the sample, we have the pair 
)) ( ), ( ( 2 1 c p c p i i  of the probabilities of Type I and Type II errors. For all c, we plot the 
probabilities of Type I–II errors. One model is considered uniformly superior to another if 
the corresponding plot lies below the plot for the other model. 
In Figure 4, the plots of probabilities of Type I–II errors are presented for the mod-
els without clustering and with clustering with respect to GB/TA, TA and Eq/TA. In the 
most interesting area of small probabilities of Type I error, we note improvement with 
GB/TA. Of course, we should also remember that the model with GB/TA clustering con-
tains three times more coefficients. The charts for separate clusters look more impressive 
(e.g. see Figure 5 for the cluster GKO>10% and more examples in Golovan et al., 2003). 
For the probability of Type I error less than 20%, the probability of a Type II error de-
creases by 15–35%. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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Figure 5. Probabilities of Type I–II errors for banks from the cluster GB/TA>10%. 
      The GB/TA model is only estimated for banks from the cluster GB/TA>10% 
 
Out-of-sample forecast 
An out-of-sample forecast is obviously the preferred method of model comparison. We use 
a random number generator here to divide the sample into the two parts: a main group 
(1465 banks) and a control group (100 banks). Models are estimated using the main group, 
and then error probabilities are estimated for the control part of the sample. The averaged BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2004 
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results of 1000 trials are presented in Figure 6. The plots are quite similar to the in-sample 






















Figure 6    Figure 7 
 
To reveal the model’s ability to forecast reliable and unreliable banks, we calculate the 
proportions n1 and n2 of banks that actually failed of the “worst” and “best’ ten banks in 
each control part of the sample. In an ideal forecast, n1=100% and n2=0%. Our results for 
1000 trials are averaged and 17 attempts are presented in Figure 7. 
In forecasting reliable banks, the best results are obtained with clustering by the 
government bonds ratio GB/TA, which gives less than 1% error for the 10% of the best 
banks in the control sample of 100. For the revealing of the problem banks better works the 
model without clusters and the model with clustering by the equity ratio Eq/TA. They give 




2.4  Automatic classification 
 
The model that allows two different probability of default logit models in each of the two 
clusters may be described as follows: 
Consider a logit model that separates banks into two clusters. The probability that a 
bank with the vector of parameters  z  belongs to the first cluster is  ) ( γ z F ′ , where γ  is the Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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vector of the coefficients and F is the cumulative distribution function of the logit distribu-
tion. The probability that the bank belongs to the second cluster is then  ) ( 1 γ z F ′ − . 
For each of the two clusters, we have a logit model of bank survival. Let  ) ( 1 β x F ′  
and ) ( 2 β x F ′  be the probabilities of the bank with the vector of parameters x to survive, 
conditionally it belongs to the first or second cluster. Different sets of bank parameters 
may be used for bank classification and probability of survival. 
The contribution of bank j to the likelihood function is  
   ( ) ( )
j j j j y y y y
j x F x F z F x F x F z F L




1 1 )) ( 1 ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( β β γ β β γ ,     (2) 
 
where  1 = j y  if the bank survives and 0 if it fails. The estimates of the parameters of the 
model,  2 1, β β  and γ  are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function  
 
2 1, ,
2 1 max ln ) , , ( ln
β β γ
β β γ → =∑
j
j L L .       (3) 
  
Since there is no guarantee the function (3) has a global maximum, there is an apparent 
problem in parameter estimation. For example, if the set  ) , , ( 2 1 β β γ  is the solution of the 
problem, then the set  ) , , ( 1 2 β β γ −  is the solution as well. 
We find the best solution to the problem (2)–(3) contains parameters z = {Eq/As, 
LNTA} for cluster discrimination and x = {Eq/TA, RES/TA, LNI/TA, GGO/TA, LA/TA} 
for the probability of survival/default in each cluster. The results of the model clustering 
estimates are presented in Table 8. Note that the clustering suggested by the model is simi-
lar to the CBR’s division (Table 1), i.e. the CBR allows a lower capital adequacy for large 
banks. Indeed, the results of automatic clustering could be used as is by the CBR to give 
greater flexibility to capital adequacy requirements. 
 
Table 8 
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We choose the threshold 0.5 for clustering, i.e. we assign a bank to the first cluster when 
5 . 0 ) ( < ′γ z F ; otherwise, it gets assigned to the second cluster. In both clusters, the logit 
model can be estimated separately. The plot of the probabilities of Type I–II errors for the 
logit model with the set of the parameters x without clustering and for the forecast based on 
the clustering (2)–(3) and separate logit models
4 in each cluster is presented in Figure 8. 

















































   Figure. 8. Automatic classification 
 
Models (2)–(3) may be slightly modified to get an automatic classification algorithm for 
several clusters. 
The comparison of in-sample forecast performance of the various models with clus-
tering is presented in Tables 9 and 10. As seen, out-of-sample and in-sample forecasts are 
roughly similar in terms of performance. 
Table 9 compares the models from an investor’s point of view. For each model 
(100, 200, etc.) the “best” banks are chosen and the number of actually failed bank among 
those chosen is calculated. 
For example, column 3 (with the heading 200) contains information on the 200 
“best” banks. Row “average” shows the expected number (34) of the failed banks, if the 
sample of 200 is chosen randomly; row “basic” presents results for the model m0 from the 
table in Appendix D, where only 5 banks failed. The rows marked GB/TA, TA, Eq/TA and 
                                                 
4 Coefficients of the separate logit models are presented at the Appendix E. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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LNI/TA present the results for the model with the same set of parameters, but estimated 
separately in the clusters (“expert” cluster procedure). The last row presents the results of 
automatic classification described in this section. It is clear that using the model signifi-
cantly reduces the likelihood of choosing a bank that will default. Clustering in respect to 
the government bonds ratio decreases the number of failed banks to 0. In comparing the 
results of the automatic procedure with the expert approach, one should consider that the 
automatic clustering model has 15 parameters, less than the expert cluster models (36 pa-
rameters). The “basic” model has 12 parameters. 
  
Table 9. Number of failed banks in the *** best rankings 
***  100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 
Average  17 34 50 67 84  101  117  134 
Basic  0  5  9  12 18 26 37 53 
GB/TA  0 0 1 4 8  16  24  33 
TA  1 2 6 8  13  22  29  39 
Eq/TA  1 3 8  13  16  16  21  28 
LNI/TA  0 6 9  15  18  25  33  43 
Automatic  clust.  1 3 6  11  18  23  28  34 
 
Table 10 compares the models from the point of view of the bank supervisory authority. 
For each model (100, 200, etc.), the “worst” banks are chosen and calculated against the 
number of actually failed bank among them. For example, selecting from the 250 “worst” 
banks (16% of all banks), we detect as many as 136 banks that will eventually fail (52% of 
all failed banks). This ability to narrow the field of potentially troubled banks can likely 
save supervisory authorities considerable time and money in in-site inspections. 
 
Table 10. Number of failed banks in the *** worst ranking (total 263) 
***  50  100 150 200 250 300 350 
Average  8  17 25 34 42 50 59 
Basic  39  67  91  115 128 138 152 
GB/TA  41  71  92  116 129 142 152 
LNI/TA  42  73  94  114 129 144 158 
Eq/TA  41  74  96  116 136 153 166 
TA  42  68  92  114 128 144 155 
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3  Macroeconomic variables 
 
Papers that model bank defaults (e.g. Martin, 1977; Estrella et al., 2000; Kolari et al., 
2002) do not use macrovariables in their models. All these papers consider the US banking 
system, which traditionally has enjoyed relatively stable economic conditions. The eco-
nomic situation in Russia during 1996–2003 was far from stable, and it seems to be plausi-
ble that including macroeconomic indicators into our models might improve model per-
formance. 
Several papers use macrovariables in studies of probability of default for firms, 
loans and bonds. Engelmann and Porath (2003) show that the growth of real GDP and 
growth of money (M3) improve results of the logit models of German company defaults in 
1989–2000. Lawrence and Smith (1992) use the unemployment rate in a study of US home 
credit defaults. Golovan et al. (2004) use macroindicators in their probability of default 
models for Russian banks. 
A number of Basel committee publications stress the role of the macroenvironment 
in estimating the risk of default, e.g. Amato and Furfine (2003), Borio (2003), Segoviano 
and Lowe (2002). 
Godlewski (2004) in his paper on banks in emerging market economies (does not 
include Russia) pointed out that the use of macrovariables may improve bank scoring mod-
els. 
Among papers studying the macroeconomic indicators that drive banking and fi-
nancial crises, Demirguс-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) apply a pooled logit model in their 
study of banking crises in developed and developing countries in 1980–1994. They find 
that GDP growth, the real interest rate, inflation and terms of trade are highly significant in 
all model specifications. They do not detect an independent effect from the exchange rate, 
noting that inflation and terms of trade already capture that effect. 
Komulainen and Lukkarila (2003) use a panel probit model in their study of the fi-
nancial crises in 31 emerging market countries in 1980–2001. They found many macroin-
dicators are important for financial crises prediction, including the unemployment rate, in-
dustrial production and others not identified by Demirguс-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). 
Since financial and banking crises are often related, these macroindicators preliminarily 
can also be important for identifying bank defaults. 
 Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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3.1  Data 
 
Bank data. The quarterly balance sheet data of the Russian banks for the period 1996–
2002 are used in this section.
5 The variable LIVE was constructed according to the defini-
tion of bank default described in section 2.1. 
To avoid estimation problems with the correlated observations and to increase the 
ratio of failed banks in the sample, we reduce the sample. Remember, we want to retain all 
information on defaults and do not have for the bank observations for our banks closer than 
two years in time. 
For each failed bank, we take the time of failure t (measured in quarters) and let 
LIVE=0. We connect to this observation the appropriate bank parameter values (Table 1) 
and macroindicators (Table 11) at the time  8 − t .
6 We then take the same bank at time 
8 − t  and let LIVE=1. We connect to this observation bank parameter values and macroin-
dicators at time  16 − t . We continue at that manner while we still have the data for that 
bank in the complete sample. 
For a surviving bank, the procedure is a bit different. We randomly choose a quarter 
t from the eight quarters in the period 2001–2002, let LIVE=1 and connect to this observa-
tion bank parameter values and macroindicators at time  8 − t . We continue to track this 
bank back in time in the same way as described for a failed bank. 
The sample reducing procedure described above leads to biased estimators (Scott 
and Wild, 1986). However, the estimates of slope coefficients are unbiased, hence our eco-
nomic interpretations of regression results would not be affected. Nor does the bias in the 
intercept affect our results as we consider all possible thresholds c for model comparison. 
                                                 
5 Again, data kindly provided by the Mobile Information Agency. 
6 Again as in section 2.1, using a two-year lag between bank data and observed status provides the best re-
sults. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Figure 9. Distribution of bank defaults in our sample, section 3 
 
After the described above selection procedure we have got the sample with 3158 observa-
tions, with 255 defaults among them (8.07%). The distribution of the bank defaults in that 
sample is presented in Figure 9. The distribution does not coincide with the overall distri-
bution of the defaults, because in our sample only those defaults are included for which we 
have balance sheet data from two years before the default. The overall distribution of Rus-
sian banks defaults is presented in Appendix B. 
 
Macroeconomic indicators. The list of macroindicators considered for the models is pre-
sented in Table 11. Our choice of a set of possible macrovariables was driven by expert 
opinion and macrovariables identified elsewhere as significant.
7 For some indicators, their 
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Table 11. List of macroindicators 
Macroindicators    
Real GDP index (seasonally adjusted)*  VVP  % 
Consumer price index  CPI  % 
Deflator **  Defl   
Unemployment   UNEMPLN  million 
Unemployment rate  UNEMPLP  % 
Index of investments in capital (seasonally adjusted)***  INV  % 
Exchange rate RUR/USD  ERATE  ruble/dollar 
Export/Import ratio  EXP/IMP   
Increase of industry production  PRPROD  % 
Change in real income  REALINC  % 
Increase in exchange rate (year)  DERATE  ruble/dollar 
Increase in exchange rate (quarter)  DERATE1  ruble/dollar 
Change in GDP rate (year)  DVVP  % 
Change in GDP rate (quarter)  DVVP1  % 
* 1994.01 = 100;    ** based on CPI;    *** 1993.I=100  
 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of some bank financial ratios in our sample. 
All bank parameters in the dataset are measured in thousands of rubles. The mean value of 
the total assets in the sample, measured in US dollars by historical exchange rate, is about 
$100 million. This is a tiny value compared to the total assets of major international banks 
and even Russia’s largest banks. This in itself is reason enough to take the log of this pa-
rameter to reduce its variability. Data are distributed over time here, so it seems reasonable 
to take the deflated value of the total assets as a measure for bank size, i.e. log(TA/defl). 
 
Table 12 
 LNI/TA  NGS/TA NWA/TA  CFB/TA Log(TA/defl)  Log(TA/defl)
2  Eq/TA PBT/TA 
Mean 0.300  0.087  0.105  0.030  10.37  111.3  0.301  0.016 
Max 0.988  0.978  0.943  0.933 16.98  288.2 0.997  0.783 
Mean 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  3.98  15.9 –0.729  –0.716 
Std.dev. 0.205  0.143  0.121  0.084  1.95  41.7  0.221  0.057 
 
To decide whether to include macrovariables in our models, we first consider the correla-
tions of these macrovariables (Table 13). Most macrovariables are highly correlated, which 
means that including two or more of them into the model may cause a multicollinearity 
problem. Selected below in Table 13 are the pairs of macrovariables that are least corre-
lated and potentially could be included into the model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
7 For bank and financial crises, we take from Demirguс-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Komulainen and 
Lukkarila (2003). For the firm defaults, we use Engelmann and Porath (2003). For the Russian banks, we 
follow Golovan et al. (2004). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 13 
 CPI  ERATE  EXP/IMP  REALINC  PRPROD  UNEMPLN  UNEMPLP  VVP 
CPI 1  -0.040  -0.010 -0.521 -0.586  0.287  0.301  -0.441 
ERATE -0.040  1 0.933  0.043 0.609  0.037  0.081 0.680 
EXP/IMP -0.010  0.933 1  0.156  0.534  -0.069  -0.028 0.669 
REALINC -0.521  0.043 0.156  1  0.401  -0.816  -0.822 0.711 
PRPROD -0.586  0.609 0.534  0.401  1  -0.178  -0.153 0.723 
UNEMPLN  0.287 0.037  -0.070  -0.816  -0.178  1  0.996  -0.618 
UNEMPLP 0.301 0.081  -0.028  -0.822  -0.153  0.996  1  -0.584 
VVP -0.441  0.680 0.669  0.711  0.723  -0.618  -0.584  1 
 
 
3.2  Models with macroindicators 
 
In the following section, we consider whether including macrovariables improves the per-
formance of our probability of default model. We now select the model without macrovari-
ables (base model). As in section 2, our model selection is based on statistical criteria: z-
statistics of coefficients, McFadden R
2, Akaike criterion and economic interpretation. The 
base model is presented in the first column of Table 14. Intuitively, it appears the signs of 
the coefficients fit our preliminary expectations. 
We use a pooled probit model because it shows marginally better results than the pooled 
logit model. The panel data model (quite appropriate here) and the probit panel model with 
random effects give exactly the same results. The ρ  parameter is insignificant in all model 
specifications. 
The profit-before-tax ratio (PBT/TA), which can be used as a measure of management 
quality, has a positive impact. The credits-to-non-financial-institutions ratio (LNI/TA) pro-
duces a negative effect. This differs from the conclusion in section 2, but note that, in con-
trast to section 2, which examines the crisis, this model uses data for a five-year period and 
the level of credits significantly vary with macroenvironment. The non-government securi-
ties and non-working assets ratios (NGS/TA and NWA/TA) show a negative effect, indi-
cating poor asset management. This model allows for optimal value of bank size, i.e. 
ln(TA/defl) = 10.44, which is slightly higher than the mean value of that parameter in the 
sample. Surprisingly, the equity ratio Eq/TA is insignificant when included in the model. 
This may be explained by multicollinearity with the set of already included ratios (obvi-
ously, all possible ratios add up to 1). Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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Now we add our macroindicators (Table 11) to the base model. The best two models in 
terms of statistics values appear in columns 2 and 3 of Table 14. Macromodel 1 includes 
the export-import ratio, while macromodel 2 includes the ruble/dollar exchange rate. All 
statistical criteria of the two macromodels (log likelihood, Akaike, McFadden R
2) are bet-
ter than those for the base model. Some improvement could be achieved by including two 
macrovariables. It remains unclear whether these improvements are economically signifi-
cant. The next two sections, 3.3 and 3.4, consider this issue. 
Table 14 shows that the signs of the coefficients agree with the economic intuition. The 
profit-before-tax ratio (PBT/TA), which measures management quality, enhances bank re-
liability. The non-government securities and non-working assets ratios (NGS/TA and 
NWA/TA) have a negative effect and indicate poor asset management. The credit-to-non-
financial-institutions ratio (LNI/TA) also has a negative impact. 
Including macrovariables increases the value of the PBT/TA coefficient and decreases the 
values of the NGS/TA and NWA/TA coefficients. The marginal effect of the PBT/TA de-
clines after the crisis. The marginal effects of LNI/TA, NGS/TA and NWA/TA are also 
less negative after the crisis. The marginal effect of bank size, ln(TA/DEFL), does not 
change after the crisis. 
 Table 14 
 Coefficient 
Variable  Base model  Macromodel 1  Macromodel 2 
C        0.150     –0.847    –0.331 
PBT/TA        1.226**       1.541**      1.663*** 
LNI/TA      –1.188***     –0.976***    –0.930*** 
NGS/TA      –1.008***     –1.247***    –1.394*** 
NWA/TA      –1.346***     –1.223***    –1.204*** 
CFB/TA      –0.546     –0.277    –0.113 
Ln(TA/DEFL)        0.376***       0.367***      0.368*** 
Ln(TA/DEFL)
2      –0.0181***     –0.0181***    –0.0184*** 
EXP/IMP         0.621***   
ERATE           0.0346*** 
Log likelihood   –845.11   –807.73   –799.74 
LR statistics (8, 9 df)      81.99     156.76     172.72 
Akaike criterion       0.5403        0.517        0.512 
McFadden R2       0.0463        0.088        0.097 
 
A positive EXP/IVP coefficient may imply that a higher export-import ratio characterizes a 
healthier economy, and hence macroeconomic stability. In such circumstances, the stability 
of the banking system should also be expected to increase. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Less obvious is the interpretation of the positive sign of the ERATE coefficient. In Russia, 
a rising exchange rate (ruble depreciation) is always associated with economic destabiliza-
tion. On the other hand, a high exchange rate boosts the export-import ratio. In fact, the 
two variables are highly correlated (Table 13). 
 
3.3  Model comparison: Type I – II errors 
 
In-sample forecast. The probabilities of Type I and II errors in the sample are calculated 
for each threshold c. The plots, corresponding to the three models (Table 14) are presented 
in Figure 10. Improvements from including macrovariables are observed, but none of the 
two macromodels is uniformly better than another; the corresponding plots often intersect. 
To test the in-sample predictive power of the models, we choose samples of 100 and 
500 of the most reliable and most distressed banks according to the rankings generated by 
each of the three models. The proportions of actually failed banks captured by the samples 
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Figure 10. Probabilities of Type I–II errors 
 
We recall here that a random assigning of banks into sets of 100 would capture 100/3158, 
or 3.2% of all 255 defaults, while a random sample of 500 would capture 15.8% of all de-
faults. From the supervisory point of view, an examination of 500 banks identified as most 
distressed by the base model (15.8% of the total) would identify as much as 34.5% of all 
banks that will enter into default within two years. Adding macrovariables, the model in-Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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creases this proportion to 46.3%. For the investor, selection of the 100 most reliable banks 
using our model decreases the expected number of failed banks in the sample from 
255*3.2% = 8 to 3 (base model) and to 1 (macromodel 2). The results are compatible with 




Banks Sample  size 




100 8.2% 12.2% 14.1%  “distressed”  500 34.5% 45.5%  46.3% 
100 1.2%  1.2%  0.4%  “reliable”  500 7.5%  6.3%  6.3% 
 
Out-of-sample forecast. Our procedure involves selecting 300 observations randomly and 
excluding them from the whole sample. For the rest of the sample, all three models are 
evaluated and the selected 300 observations are ranked according to each of the three mod-
els. The proportion of the total number of all defaults in the sets of 10 and 50 most reliable 
and most problematic banks of these 300 from the point of view of the each of the three 
models are calculated. The results are presented in Table 16. Again, as in section 2, we do 





Banks Sample  size 




10 7.3%  11.9%  12.5%  “distressed”  50 34.5%  46.6% 47.0% 
10 1.3% 1.5% 0.6%  “reliable”  50 8.1% 6.9% 6.3% 
 
 
3.4  Model comparison: Heuristic criteria 
 
As noted, the cost of a Type I error (classifying a failed bank as a reliable) to an investor 
would be distinctly higher than the cost of a Type II error. If the ratio between the two 
costs for the investor were available, then it would be possible to identify an optimal value 
of threshold c that minimizes a linear loss function over the curve in a plot of Type I–II BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 21/ 2004 
 
  35 
error probabilities. Below two heuristic criteria are suggested, based on two rough models 
of investor behavior. 
Let the investor use a model and threshold c for bank classification. 
−
c X  is the set 
of the banks classified as “distressed” ( c p < ˆ ), while 
+
c X  is the set of banks classified as 
“reliable” ( c p ≥ ˆ ). Notations for the number of banks for all four possible outcomes ap-
pear in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Banks Bankruptcies  Still  solvent 
Classified as “distressed”, 
−
c X   I.      c m   II.     c c m n −  
Classified as “reliable” 
+
c X   III.    c m M −   IV.    ) ( c c m n M N − − −  
 
Consider a naive investor, without a model, who invest S amount of money in banks. This 
investor can use a “uniform” investment strategy, i.e. equal parts of S/N are invested in all 
banks, or a “proportional” strategy in which the size of each investment is proportional to 
the size of the bank, i.e. an investment in bank k would equal  ) / ( all k k VB S S Σ ⋅ = , where 
∑ = = Σ
N
j j all VB
1 . The first strategy models the behavior of an investor eager to diversify 
investments, while the second strategy closely models the behavior of the entire set of in-
vestors. 
Let r is the bank deposit interest rate, constant over time (we will take later r = 15% 
or 20%, i.e. average figures in Russia for the considered time period). We now assume that 
the investments in the failed banks are completely lost. Under this assumption, the net in-
come of under the “uniform” strategy and the “proportional” strategy will equal (4) and 
(5), respectively. 
N









) ( ,   (4) 
() ) ( ) ( III I IV II c c r
S
all
+ + Σ − Σ
Σ
.     (5) 
 
(Summations are evaluated over the groups of banks. See notation in Table 17, e.g. 
∑ + + = Σ
III I III I ) ( j VB c .) 
Now consider the behavior of a savvy model-wielding investor. After choosing a 
threshold c, this investor classifies banks as “distressed” or “reliable.” On the basis of this Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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classification, the savvy investor only invests in “reliable” banks and holds any money that 
would otherwise have been invested in a “distressed” bank under the strategies of the naive 
investor.
8 We then consider this excessive net income of the savvy investor as a utility 
function to be optimized. The utility functions have the form (6) for the uniform invest-























) ( ) (
) (
II I .     (7) 
 
Of course, the savvy investor can determine the optimal threshold c. Finally, the two utility 








= ,   ) ( max
1 0




= .   (8) 
 
Table 18 presents the statistical and heuristic criteria for the model comparison for the base 
model (number 0, first row) and for the 24 models that differ from the base model in terms 
of added regressors. One additional macrovariable is included in models 1–14; models 15–
22 contain two additional macrovariables. For comparison purposes, we include model 23, 
which contains time dummies for all quarters and thus shows the limit of the model im-
provements after including additional macrovariables. Model 24 contains a dummy for 










                                                 
8 In the case where the investor has incentive to invest all his/her money in “reliable” banks, the optimal be-
havior is simply to invest all money S into one, the most “reliable” bank. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Table 18 shows that the inclusion of the macrovariables improves the statistical criteria of 
the models and almost all models improve the heuristic criteria. The best performance of 
models 1–14 is found in models 1 and 2, which include exchange rate, ERATE and the ex-
port-import ratio EXP/IMP. For these models, the heuristic criterion PRU increases (in 
comparison with the base model) from 1% to 2%, while the heuristic criterion PRP in-
creases (compared to the base model) from 10% to 13%. 
In some cases, e.g. if the rate of the GDP grows, DVVP1, is added to the model 9, 
the values of the heuristic criteria fall. It should not be misleading. The model are esti-
mated by the maximum likelihood, maximizing the likelihood function, which automati-
cally mean maximizing McFadden R-square, but the heuristic criteria. 
Including two macrovariables (models 15–18) or the cross-terms (models 19–22) 
insignificantly improve the statistical and heuristic criteria. 
The statistical and heuristic criteria of the model 23 are so close to the criteria val-
ues for the models 1 or 2, which it is possible to conclude, that including one of the two 
macrovariables already captures almost all effect of the varying macroenvironment. 
The model 24 includes the dummy variable CRISIS, which is equal 1 after the cri-
sis of August 1998. Figure 11 presents the time plots of the variables ERATE and CRISIS, 
which look very similar. It is no surprise then that the models’ criteria are similar as well. 
Thus, there still is the open question if it is the influence of the macrovariable to the bank 
default which is found or the structural break in the Russian banking system after the crisis. 
That question is partially addressed in the section 4, which studies the Russian banking 
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In Table 19, the optimal threshold c* for the three models in Table 14 are calculated for the 
heuristic criteria for interest rate r = 15%. 
 
Table 19 
Criterion  Base model  Macromodel 1  Macromodel 2 
PRU (r=0.15)  0.884 0.853 0.848 
PRP  (r=0.15)  0.869 0.848 0.834 
 
The table shows that the optimal threshold varies in the interval 0.834 – 0.884, and its 
variation for the models with a macrovariable is even smaller (0.834 – 0.853). These fig-
ures are lower than the generally recommended threshold for binary models equal to the 
ratio of 1 in the sample (0.92 in our case). 
We now detail model 21 (see Table 18). The relevant coefficient estimates are pre-




C -0.507  
PBT/TA 1.474 ** 
LNI/TA -2.295 *** 
NGS/TA -1.218 *** 
NWA/TA -1.232 *** 
CFB/TA -0.277  
LOG(TA/DEFL) 0.381 *** 
LOG(TA/DEFL)
2  -0.0187 *** 
EXP/IMP 0.363 *** 
EXP/IMP*(LNI/TA) 0.865 ** 
 
The sign of the LNI/TA coefficient is the sign of the expression  
EXP/IMP 0.865 2.295 ⋅ + , 
which says that the impact of credit to the real economy may be positive when 
2.655 EXP/IMP > . However, during the period under the consideration (January 1996 –
April 2001) this variable was less than 2.5. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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4  After the crisis 
 
We now attempt to identify changes in the Russian banking system over time. We use a 
rolling window with the window sizes of four, six and eight quarters, estimating the probit 
probability of default model in the window. Since our sample (rolling window) is now 
much smaller than the one we use in section 3, we consider two alternative ways for con-
structing the data set. First, using all available observations, we again establish that the 
pooled probit model gives the same result as the random-effect panel probit model. Sec-
ond, we apply a sample selection procedure similar to that described in section 3.1. The 
sole difference is that we use a one-year interval between observations of same bank rather 
than a two-year interval as in section 3.1. 
All possible combinations for window size and data type give similar results in 
terms of economic interpretation. For our purposes, we only need to discuss one result. In 
Table 21, we present the pooled probit estimation with an eight-quarter rolling window. 
The row “Time” corresponds to the beginning of the rolling window. 
From the table, we observe the structural change in the banking system after the 
1998 crisis (third quarter, 1998.3). Variables PBT/TA, LNI/TA and OVL/TA, which were 
insignificant before the crisis, became significant after the crisis. That could mean that 
banks became more involved in financing the real economy after the crisis, and that the 
quality of balance sheet data, particularly overdue loans (OVL) and profit (PBT), improved 
from 2000 onwards. In the late 1990s, banks were using several accounting tricks such as 
“tax optimization” and not declaring overdue loans on their balance sheets (Soest van et 
al., 2003). 
For the periods following 1999.2, both variables LNI/TA and (LNI/TA)
2 are sig-
nificant. This permits estimating the implied “optimal” value of an investment in the real 
sector of the economy. The plot of this estimated optimal value is presented at Figure 12. 
We see that the value steadily increases from 0.35 to 0.41 during the last three years. This 
evidence suggests gradual improvements in the Russian banking system (i.e. financing of 
the real sector of economy should be the main function of a banking system). Note that the 
ratio of Russian banks’ total investments in the real economy to their total assets also grew 
during the period, i.e. 1999 (28.6%), 2000 (29.5%) and 2001 (35.1%). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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9 Bold means significance at 5% level; bold italic means significance at 10% level. 
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The exchange rate variable became insignificant after the crisis, suggesting that after the 
crisis this parameter has much less impact on bank reliability than earlier. Financial market 
volatility also decreases and operations become more transparent. The volume of high-risk 
























































  Fig. 12. Implied “optimal” values of LNI/TA 
 
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the measure of the model fit, McFadden R
2, over time. 
The lowest point in the plot corresponds to the crisis. The measure rises steadily after the 
crisis, indicating both stabilization of the Russian banking system after the crisis and in-





























































































































Figure 13. Plot of McFadden R2 statistic over time BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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5  Conclusions 
 
Our results found the following: 
•  Despite the poor quality of the Russian balance sheet data, the bank probability of 
default models can be used for an EWS. 
•  Model modifications that took into account the structural non-homogeneity of the 
set of banks proved helpful. 
•  Including macroindicators improves the model performance. 
•  Russian banking supervision authorities could use the results of automatic cluster-
ing in designing more flexible capital adequacy requirements. 
•  The models are not stable and need regular reestimation in a varying macroeco-
nomic environment if they are to be used in an EWS. 
Heuristic criteria that reflect the point of view of an investor were suggested for model 
comparison. 
The rolling window estimation of the models indicated several features of devel-
opment of the Russian banking system after the 1998 crisis. Increasing goodness-of-fit 
measure revealed stabilization of the banking system. This may be explained by develop-
ment and stabilization of the Russian banking system and a more predictable macroeco-
nomic environment. Emerging significance in the models of bank parameters such as 
profit-before-tax and overdue loans ratios hinted at improving quality of bank accounting 
reports. Reasonable increases in the implied “optimum” value of the credits-to-non-
financial-institutions ratio was seen as evidence of increasing opportunities for bank in-
vestment in the real sector of the economy. The data on overall bank investments in the 
real economy showed that tendency is realized with a lag of 1-1.5 years. 
Models similar to those proposed in this paper could be used by Russian bank su-
pervision authorities as an element of an EWS and for establishing more flexible capital 
adequacy requirements. The models also could be used by commercial banks in an IRB 
framework for estimating risk in line with the Basel II Accord. Anatoly Peresetsky, Alexandr Karminsky and Sergei Golovan l      Probability of default models of Russian banks 
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Appendix 
 
A. Correlation of bank ratios, April 1998 
 
  LNTA RES/TA LNI/TA  GB/TA Eq/TA  LA/TA  DPC/TA CANW/TA  NGS/TA 
LNTA 1  -0.12  0.02  0.18  -0.29  -0.25  0.13  -0.04  0.00 
RES/TA -0.12  1  0.12  -0.16  -0.25  -0.22  -0.03  0.23  -0.07 
LNI/TA 0.02  0.12  1  -0.22  0.03  -0.25  0.29  -0.15  -0.34 
GB/TA 0.18  -0.16  -0.22  1  0.06  -0.09  -0.04  -0.25  -0.09 
Eq/TA -0.29  -0.25  0.03  0.06  1  0.11  -0.09  -0.23  0.24 
LA/TA -0.25  -0.22  -0.25  -0.09  0.11  1  -0.14  -0.28  -0.16 
DPC/TA 0.13  -0.03  0.29  -0.04  -0.09  -0.14  1 0.05  -0.12 
CANW/TA -0.04  0.23  -0.15  -0.25  -0.23  -0.28  0.05  1  -0.24 
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E. Separate models in clusters 
 
The table below presents results of the separate logit models in each of the clusters ob-
tained through automatic classification and model (2)–(3) estimates for  2 1, β β . 
 
  Cluster 1 (646 banks)  Cluster 2 (923 banks) 
Variable  Logit  Model           Logit  Model 
C  −0.24***   −0.45***  1.56*** 2.08*** 
Eq/TA 2.08*** 0.97***   −1.38***  −2.51*** 
RES/TA  −10.05***  −10.59***  −1.35***  1.84*** 
LNI/TA 2.21***  2.45***  1.35*** 1.02*** 
GB/TA 5.94***  5.80***  12.12*** 286.89*** 
LA/TA 6.06***  5.69***  3.10*** 3.01*** 
McFadden R
2  0.24   0.10   
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